560 heather douglas the normative standard needs to be reconsidered for science that has clear non-epistemic impacts, being value-free is not a laudable goal as i will note at the end of my paper, this does not mean any argument whatsoever is a good argument in science accepting the role of values in science. Given considerable epistemic authority in shaping policy on issues of great moral and cultural significance, and the politicizing of these issues has become highly contentious since world war ii, most philosophers of science have purported the concept that science should be “value-free” in this book, heather e douglas. Heather e douglas, science, policy, and the value-free ideal, u of pittsburgh press, 2009, 210pp, $2795 (pbk), isbn 9780822960263 but why restrict epistemic values to necessary criteria, rather than include those that help us achieve reliable knowledge, as simplicity and explanatory power. Cognitive values without, however, compromising its epistemic goals the core of the argument in defense of this thesis can be found in chapters 5 and 6 heather douglas thinks that developing this alternative conceptualization of scientific knowledge is an important task for the same reasons for which. Sideration when epistemic values leave room for uncertainty (for more dis- cussion, see brown ) there are different ways of conceptualizing this secondary role for nonepistemic values heather douglas (2009) distin- guishes epistemic criteria such as predictive competence and internal con- sistency from the range. Values in science heather douglas forthcoming in the oxford handbook in the philosophy of science abstract: after describing the origins and nature of the value-free keywords: value-free ideal, epistemic values, cognitive values, inductive risk, direct vs indirect roles, responsible science, science in society introduction. Some quick context: in a 2012 paper, winsberg applied heather douglas' inductive risk argument to climate science put very generally, douglas' argument is that, when scientists make judgments that have non-epistemic consequences, they have a responsibility to take those consequences into account.
Values by epistemic values i mean values that promote the attainment of truth, either intrinsically or extrinsically as daniel steel explains, an epi- stemic value is 2013 “epistemic dependence and collective scientific knowledge” synthese 191:37–53 douglas, heather 2000 “inductive risk and values in science. Heather douglas (born march 21, 1969) is a philosopher of science best known for her work on the role of values in science, science policy, the importance of science for policymaking, and the history of philosophy of science douglas is the waterloo chair in science and society at the university of waterloo, and she. Scientists can quite properly make non-epistemic value judgements in the course of in- quiry these authors to relate du bois' position on value free ideals in science to his epistemic defence of democracy points of convergence between du bois' position and that of heather douglas 2 the debate as.
Heather e douglas university of waterloo forthcoming in peter schroeder- heister, gerhard heinzmann, wilfrid hodges & pierre edouard bour (eds), logic (douglas 2009a) in light of the evidence produced by such tests, the contrast to the view articulated here, that some values, namely epistemic and cognitive. Lar, heather e douglas (2000) argues that there is inductive risk in the choice of methodology (eg, levels of statistical significance), the characterization of evidence, and the interpretation of results these arguments, if successful, show that values traditionally regarded as non-epistemic, including ethical and social values. Rejecting the ideal of value-free science 3 heather douglas “external” parts of science, ie the choice of projects, limitations of methodology (particularly with respect to the use of human subjects), and the application of science related technologies2 so the term “value-free science” really refers to the norm of epistemic.
Loosely following a framework laid out by heather douglas in a recent essay, we will first examine various challenges to the value-free ideal (see “tentative schedule” on next page) we will then take rooney 1992 “on values in science: is the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction useful” longino 1996 “ cognitive and. This chapter begins by explaining why nonepistemic values are logically needed for reasoning in science, even in the internal stages of the process it then bolsters the point with an examination of ways to block this necessity, all of which prove unsatisfactory finally, it argues that rejection of the value-free ideal does not.
Buy science, policy, and the value-free ideal by heather douglas (isbn: 9780822960263) from amazon's book store some scientists have been given considerable epistemic authority in shaping policy on issues of great moral and cultural significance, and the politicizing of these issues has become highly contentious. State of the field: why novel prediction matters heather douglas and pd magnus 1 abstract: there is considerable disagreement about the epistemic value of novel predictive success, ie when a scientist predicts an unexpected phenomenon, experiments are conducted, and the prediction proves to be accurate.
The distinction was especially central to heather douglas's recent book, science, policy, and the value-free ideal (2009) her goal was to tear down the assumption that science should be value free (which, as she clarified, is really the ideal that it should be free of non-epistemic values in the heart of scientific reasoning. 31 epistemic and contextual values 32 acceptance of scientific hypotheses and value neutrality 33 science, policy and the value-free ideal (1982) and sandra mitchell (2004), while others adopt a critical attitude, like helen longino (1990, 1996), philip kitcher (2011a) or heather douglas (2009.
In science, policy and the value-free ideal, heather douglas of the university of tennessee–knoxville seeks to challenge the belief that science should be douglas is somewhat less clear about what she means by epistemic values, which she associates with the notion of truth, describing them as “criteria that all theories. The role and allowability of non-epistemic values in scientific reasoning heather douglas, eg, argued that scientific reasoning must consider social values i will come back to this after first discussing epistemic values in some more detail epistemic values there is no agreement on what are exactly epistemic values6. Heather douglas of university of waterloo, waterloo uwaterloo with expertise in applied philosophy, philosophy of science read 35 there is considerable disagreement about the epistemic value of novel predictive success, ie when a scientist predicts an unexpected phenomenon, experiments are conducted, and the. Keywords: inductive risk values in science social epistemology neonicitinoid research public/private distinction more recently, heather douglas has set out a similar problem: all agents, including scientists, face more recently, following douglas's work, the “argument from inductive risk” has become commonplace.
Values constitutive versus contextual values constitutive (or epistemic) values are values generated from an understanding of the goals social and moral values are not allowed to play a direct role in scientific reasoning but they can legitimately play an indirect role douglas, heather 2009 science. The role of science in policymaking has gained unprecedented stature in the united states, raising questions about the place of science and scientific expertise in the democratic process some scientists have been given considerable epistemic authority in shaping policy on issues of great moral and cultural significance,. Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the external parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies) i argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of.